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ABSTRACT
Of the many things Christopher Hitchens has been called—and there is no 
shortage of epithets or compliments—one of the most consistent is a “public 
intellectual.” Whether the term is thought apposite or wildly inaccurate (Hitchens is by 
trade a print journalist), it demands investigation—not only as a way to grasp his work 
but also as an opportunity to conceptualize the problems and possibilities inherent in 
the term itself. From understanding what “public” the intellectual serves and how to 
balance public persona concerns against intellectual ones, the recent currency of the 
term “public intellectual” represents a major moment in the history of American 
intellectual self-definition and self-reflection. W hat’s at issue in the “public 
intellectual,” I want to argue, is a conflict between the professionalization of 
knowledge and how that knowledge is produced and controlled within the centrifugal 
cultural dynamics of an outwardly expanding intellectual labor market.
This essay, then, is an attempt to interrogate and to chronicle literature that has 
addressed the public intellectual, and develop it further. Animated by the desire to 
salvage the term from bargain-bin oblivion, this essay seeks to situate Hitchens—as a 
public figure, a working “public intellectual,” and an exemplary case study—among 
the complexity of issues he (implicitly) has raised: if public intellectuals even exist 
and, if so, where they come from; if “public intellectuals” now constitute their own 
marketplace, susceptible to commodification and the vicissitudes of celebrity culture; 
and what it means to be, in the words of Hitchens himself, “against bullshit.” This 
essay should be read as part of a process of characterizing the contours of public- 
intellectual work. In short, it aims for a developing dialogue rather than a definitive 
delivery; it treats the public intellectual less as a diagnostic description than as a site of 
continuing contention.
AGAINST BULLSHIT 
Christopher Hitchens and the Public Intellectual
2Introduction: The Case of Christopher Hitchens
The problem with being a public intellectual is you get more and more public and less and less 
intellectual. —Jean Bethke Elshtain1
. . . i n  the third-world situation the intellectual is always in one way or another a political 
intellectual. — Fredric Jameson2
One of the more illustrative stories about the public persona of Christopher Hitchens 
contains many of the elements—talking-head face-off, establishment grandee, and a 
whiz-bang comeback, all wrapped into a polarizing topic on cable television—that 
have by now become so customary to political discussion, but at the time might have 
even been considered novel. The story has Hitchens, on CNN during the Gulf War, 
insisting that Charlton Heston, future president of the National Rifle Association, list 
what countries border Iraq. After botching the answer, Heston admonished Hitchens to 
stop “taking up valuable network time giving a high-school geography lesson.” Not 
missing a beat, Hitchens shot back: “Oh, keep your hairpiece on.”3
Unexceptional by the standards of Hitchens’s normal repartee, that exchange is 
nevertheless significant because it locates Hitchens —intellectually and 
temperamentally, if not geographically—within the broader framework of publicized 
debate in America, even if, or especially if, it’s made by an import. Born in 
Portsmouth, England and educated at Balliol College, Oxford, where he received a
1 Cited in Richard Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study o f D ecline  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 167.
2 Fredric Jameson, “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Social Text 
(Autumn 1986), 74.
3 Taken from Rhys Southan, “Free Radical: An Interview with Christopher Hitchens,” Reason 
(November 2001): http://reason.com/0111/fe.rs.free.shtml.
3degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Hitchens worked until 1981 for the 
London Times, the New Statesman, the Evening Standard, and the Daily Express. In 
1981, he emigrated to New York and, later, Washington D.C., where he now resides. 
From 1982 to 2002, Hitchens wrote the “Minority Report” column for The Nation, and 
today writes the “Fighting Words” column for Slate.com. He is also a contributing 
editor to The Atlantic and Vanity Fair. Along with his innumerable television and 
radio appearances over the years, he has been a visiting professor at the University of 
California, Berkeley, the University of Pittsburgh, and the New School of Social 
Research. Presently he also contributes, among others, to The Daily Mirror, Critical 
Quarterly, Foreign Policy, Free Inquiry, Granta, Grand Street, The London Review o f 
Books, Harper’s, The Los Angeles Times Book Review, New Left Review, Newsweek 
International, The New York Observer, The New York Review o f Books, Dissent, The 
Weekly Standard, and The Washington Post.
Aside from being prolific and seemingly omnipresent, Hitchens has worked to 
bill himself as a known quantity: as an advocate of atheism (he notoriously said the 
real “axis of evil” is “Christianity, Judaism, Islam”); of socialism (his sympathies are 
decidedly leftist); and of contrarianism (one need only scan his output to glean the 
importance he places upon “opposition”).4 Of the many things Hitchens has been
4 Even a sample of his book titles —along with his “Minority Report” and “Fighting Words” 
columns—show how Hitchens has staked his career on “opposition”: A Long Short War: The 
Postponed Liberation of Iraq (New York: Plume Books, 2003); Why Orwell Matters (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002); Letters to a Young Contrarian (New York: Basic Books, 2001); The Trials of 
Henry Kissinger (London: Verso, 2001); Unacknowledged Legislation: Writers in the Public
Sphere (London: Verso, 2000); No One Left To Lie To: The Triangulations of William Jefferson 
Clinton (London: Verso, 1999); The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice 
(London: Verso, 1995); For the Sake o f Argument: Essays & Minority Reports (London: Verso,
4called—and there is no shortage of epithets or compliments—one of the most 
consistent is a “public intellectual.”5 Whether the term is thought apposite or wildly 
inaccurate (Hitchens is by trade a print journalist), it demands investigation—not only 
as a way to grasp his work but also as an opportunity to conceptualize the problems 
and possibilities inherent in the term itself. From understanding what “public” the 
intellectual serves and how to balance public persona concerns against intellectual 
concerns (with respect to the foregoing epigraph), the recent currency of the term 
“public intellectual” represents a major moment in the history of American intellectual 
self-definition and self-reflection. What’s at issue in the “public intellectual,” I want to 
argue, is a conflict between the professionalization of knowledge and how that 
knowledge is produced and controlled within the centrifugal cultural dynamics of an 
outwardly expanding intellectual labor market.
This essay, then, is an attempt (while certainly not exhaustive) to interrogate 
and to chronicle literature that has addressed the public intellectual, and develop it 
further. Animated by the desire to salvage the public intellectual from bargain-bin 
oblivion, this essay seeks to situate Hitchens—as a public figure, a working “public 
intellectual,” and an exemplary case study—among the complexity of issues he
1993); Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
1990). The quotation is taken from Christopher Hitchens, “You ask the questions,” The 
Independent (6 March 2002): http://news.independent.co.uk/people/profiles/storv.isp?storv=2712 
83.
5 His behavior and distinctive tone have generated enough ire (from conservatives and liberals 
alike) to constitute a subculture in its own right. His departure from The Nation, in particular, 
caused a volume of liberal outrage. See http://www.counterpunch.org/mccarthv 1022.html: “Letter 
to a Lying, Self-serving, Fat-assed, Chain-smoking, Drunken, Opportunistic, Cynical Contrarian 
(AKA C. Hitchens).” Excepting “lying,” however, Hitchens would probably disagree with none of 
the charges.
5(implicitly) has raised: if public intellectuals even exist and, if so, where they come 
from; if “public intellectuals” now constitute their own marketplace, susceptible to 
commodification and the vicissitudes of celebrity culture; and what it means to be 
“oppositional,” both to what and for whom. This essay should be read as part of a 
process of characterizing the contours of public-intellectual work. In short, it aims for 
a developing dialogue rather than a definitive delivery; it treats the public intellectual 
less as a diagnostic description than as a site of continuing contention.
Context and its Discontents
Although the term “public intellectual” is of recent vintage—it wasn’t officially 
christened until the late 1980s—historians and theorists have long grappled with what 
intellectuals are, where they operate, and what they should do with their time.6 In 
1837, for example, Ralph Waldo Emerson famously delivered “The American 
Scholar” to a captive audience at Cambridge, where he outlined the “office of the 
scholar” whose duties were “to cheer, to raise, and to guide men by showing them 
facts amidst appearances.” The scholar’s function, said Emerson, “is to resist the 
vulgar prosperity that retrogrades ever to barbarism, by preserving and communicating
6 The amount of literature on these topics is miles wide and fathoms deep, encompassing 
everything from Michel Foucault’s “specific” and Jean-Paul Sartre’s engage intellectuals to the ink 
devoted to the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia and the Enlightenment example of 
Benjamin Franklin. For recent introductions to the subject, see Ron Eyerman, Between Culture 
and Politics: Intellectuals in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) and Bruce Robbins, 
ed., Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1990), especially Stanley Aronowitz’s “On Intellectuals,” 3-56. To understand historically what 
“intellectual” may not mean, see Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1962).
6heroic sentiments, noble biographies, melodious verse, and the conclusions of 
history.” As for the scholar’s lifestyle, Emerson urged him to be “free and brave. Free 
even to the definition of freedom, ‘without any hindrance that does not arise out of his 
own constitution.’”7 In a somewhat more ecumenical vein, the Italian Antonio 
Gramsci argued that “each man ... carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, 
he is a ‘philosopher,’ an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception 
of the world.” Thus Gramsci concluded that “all men are intellectuals, one could 
therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.” From there 
he distinguished between “traditional” intellectuals, who serve “the immediate social 
function of the professional category of the intellectuals,” and “organic” intellectuals, 
who shape and direct the class constituency to which they belong. Gramsci’s 
“organic” intellectuals, unlike the traditional sort, are not necessarily “given by the 
man of letters, the philosopher, the artist.”8 They might, for instance, be factory 
workers who organize a union. For his part, the British cultural critic Raymond 
Williams embodied intellectual praxis, acting as an agent over his long career, in his 
own words, “to make learning part of the process of social change itself.”9
Given the three previous formulations, juxtaposed as much for their dissimilar 
authors as for their similar approaches, “public intellectual” would appear to be a lead- 
pipe tautology. Discourses concerning intellectual endeavor have always incorporated
7 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selected Essays, Lectures and Poems, ed. Robert D. Richardson, Jr. (New 
York: Bantam, 1990), 92-94.
8 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 9.
9 Raymond Williams, “Adult Education and Social Change,” in What I Came To Say (London: 
Hutchinson-Radius, 1989), 158. For a representative overview of his work, see The Raymond 
Williams Reader, ed. John Higgins (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
7considerations of the public and how to effect change in it. Indeed, as John Patrick 
Diggins has written, one can look back—starting with the Founding Fathers—to find 
that the “role of intellectual as a public figure has far deeper roots in American history, 
so much so that one might suggest that in the beginning American history and the 
American mind were inseparable.”10 Yet the rise of the modern university in the 
twentieth century, coupled with the increase and variety of media outlets, have 
conspired to create a wholly different grouping to intellectual work.11 What “public 
intellectual” does signal—and the reason it has picked up colloquial currency over the 
last decade—is a tension in how intellectuals produce, acquire, and communicate with 
audiences. In fact, the very genesis of the term presumes that today’s 
intellectuals—those, to take the jaundiced view, of cloistered academia—have 
somehow abandoned the public. Interestingly, the “public intellectual” has failed to
10 John Patrick Diggins, “The Changing Role of the Public Intellectual in American History,” in 
The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy and P olitics, eds. Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry 
Weinberger, M. Richard Zinman, M. Richard (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2003), 92.
11 The rate at which the university expanded and then diversified is indeed startling. As Louis 
Menand explains in his essay, “The Marketplace of Ideas” (http://www.acls.org/op49.htm): 
“Between 1945 and 1975, the number of American undergraduates increased by almost five 
hundred percent and the number of graduate students increased by nearly nine hundred percent. In 
the 1960s alone enrollments more than doubled, from 3.5 million to just under 8 million; the 
number of doctorates awarded each year tripled; and more faculty were hired than had been hired 
in the entire 325-year history of American higher education to that point. At the height of the 
expansion, between 1965 and 1972, new community college campuses were opening in the United 
States at the rate of one every week.” As for today’s media environment, especially oVer the last 
ten years, see David Foster Wallace, “Host,” The Atlantic (April 2005), 54: “Never before have 
there been so many different national news sources—different now in both terms of medium and 
ideology. Major newspapers from anywhere are available online; there are the broadcast networks 
plus public TV, cable’s CNN, Fox News, CNBC, et al., print and Web magazines, Internet bulletin 
boards, The Daily Show, e-mail newsletters, blogs. All this is well known; it’s part of the Media 
Environment we live in.”
8make an impression in Britain, France or other European countries.12 As a particularly 
American concept, Helen Small has said, “it reflects a predominantly American 
anxiety about the viability of what may be called ‘the profession of thought’—a 
concern that, in a society often thought of as peculiarly hostile to intellectual life, most 
of those who might be expected to take responsibility for its cultivation seem, now in 
the twenty-first century, to have withdrawn altogether from the public arena .... To 
speak of the public intellectual would appear to be a defensive manifestation of that 
self-consciousness: a deliberate decision to assert, in the face of perceived opposition, 
not just the continuing serviceability of the word ‘intellectual,’ but to protest (too 
much) that those to whom it is applicable, including perhaps oneself, have a role to 
play in public life.”13
Nowhere was that anxiety more apparent than in January 2001, when The Nation 
hosted a panel discussion in New York portentously titled “The Future of the Public 
Intellectual.”14 The moderator of the forum, John Donatich, also the publisher of Basic 
Books, prefaced the roundtable discussion with a battery of questions, some astride 
generations-old black holes but most germane to pinpointing what a “public 
intellectual” is:
How does [the public intellectual] reconcile itself with the venerable tradition of 
American anti-intellectualism? What does a country built on headstrong 
individualism and the myth of self-reliance do with its people convinced that they 
know best? How do we reconcile ambition and virtue, expertise and accessibility, 
multicultural sensitivity and the urge toward unified theory? Most important,
12 See “Introduction” in The Public Intellectual, ed. Helen Small (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
2002).
13 Ibid., 4.
14 The participants were: John Donatich; Russell Jacoby; Jean Bethke Elshtain; Stephen Carter; 
Herbert Gans; Steven Johnson; and Christopher Hitchens.
9how do we reconcile the fact that disagreement is a main catalyst o f progress? 
How do we battle the gravitation toward happy consensus that paralyzes our 
national debate? A new generation of public intellectuals waits to be mobilized. 
What will it look like?15
Those questions, while panoptic in their focus, are especially remarkable, for they
try, among other things, to picture a future for something that’s never really had a
stable past. What past the “public intellectual” —loaded with hushed reverence,
larded with puffed-up nostalgia—has enjoyed from books and articles has mostly
been premised on what I ’d like to call the Doberman Directive: the vague
expectation that the public intellectual marks his or her territory as does a
doberman on a leash—that is, as often and as widely as it can. I use the Doberman
Directive neologism to articulate how public-intellectual discourse has avoided
explicating its own phenomenon. Very little has been done to limn the
characteristics of the public intellectual, besides quasi-Romantic notions of
solitude (or at least without institutional affiliation or support) and madness (in the
sense of prolific output) that usually elide over socio-economic factors,
educational background, or ideas as fundamental as intention and self-promotion.
In 1990, for instance, Thomas P. Hughes and Agatha C. Hughes edited a tome
adorned with the title, Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual. In March 1995, the
Yale Law Journal ran a lengthy essay on Argentinean freedom-fighter Carlos
Santiago Nino, headlined “The Death of a Public Intellectual.” On June 29, 1998,
The Nation wrote a brief article entitled “Kazin: public intellectual,” on the death
15 From transcript o f panel discussion provided by The Nation (12 February 2001): 
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010212&c=l&s=forum.
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of Alfred Kazin, who was, we are told, “the very model of a public intellectual.”
But we are never told exactly why these individuals were, or how they became,
“public intellectuals” ; instead, the term is employed through slogan and
catchphrase—writing “accessible” prose, constrained by nothing, and sanctioned
by constantly declaimed independence—to lionize their deceased subjects. It is the
rather abstract and ill-defined nature of the Doberman Directive that has led
Joseph Epstein to remark that he “cannot recall when I first heard or read the term
‘public intellectual,’ but I do recall disliking it straightway.”16
One finds the Doberman Directive latent if not explicit in much of the
public-intellectual discourse today. Cornel West, for example, in the widely read
The Future o f Race, polishes this nugget, half-defensively and half-promotionally:
The fundamental role of the public intellectual—distinct from, yet building on, 
the indispensable work of academics, experts, analysts, and pundits—is to create 
and sustain high-quality public discourse addressing urgent public problems 
which enlightens and energizes fellow citizens, prompting them to take public 
action. This role requires a deep commitment to the life o f the mind ... 
Intellectual and political leadership is neither elitist nor populist; rather it is 
democratic, in that each of us stands in a public space, without humiliation, to put 
forward our best visions and views for the sake of the public interest.17
While West (rightly) conflates the public intellectual with a quality of “leadership,” he
does not indicate how such leadership can “create and sustain high-quality public
discourse.” He does seem to premise that leadership on simply interacting with the
public. Put alternatively, just by writing often for and communicating often with the
“public,” one automatically “enlightens and energizes,” and thus becomes a “public”
intellectual. West’s idealized public intellectual combines a wide circumference of
16 Joseph Epstein, “Intellectuals—Public and Otherwise,” Commentary (May 2000).
17 Cornel West and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Future o f the Race (New York: Knopf, 1996), 71.
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knowledge and a frequency of public interaction to spotlight important or neglected 
issues so the “public interest” may take “public action” (these two constructs of which 
later sections will address).
It is fair to say that W est’s apologia—and those like his —amounts to an 
overdetermined occupation whose very seriousness of task manifestly hopes to fell 
what doubts anxiety has left standing. What West expects of public intellectuals would 
seem to put them at risk of collapsing under the weight of their own aspirations. Such 
an expectation-laden occupation may help explain why the concept of the “public 
intellectual” was born out of crisis—it was, from the start, exalted inversely to the 
degree that its decline was lamented—and why constant crisis has attended its 
development ever since. Here I want to map out some of the central historical and 
theoretical underpinnings concerning the public intellectual, and then apply those 
presumptions and preoccupations to Hitchens himself.
Like a Drawbridge Over the Public Moat?
Though it’s difficult to pin down the first utterance of the term, we can identify 
the point after which it circulated widely. In 1987, Russell Jacoby introduced the 
notion of the “public intellectual” in The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the 
Age o f Academe. In those pages, Jacoby identifies what he sees as a singular 
phenomenon of “last intellectuals” before the 1960s, treating the rise of the modern 
university system in the last half of the twentieth century as the crucible during which
12
some intellectuals became “public” and others, by comparison, private.18 Jacoby 
outlines the public intellectual as “an incorrigibly independent soul answering to no 
one” who “contributes to public discussion” and is committed “not simply to a 
professional or private domain but to a public world—and a public language, the 
vernacular.”19 It was, then, Jacoby who originated the Doberman Directive, and fitting 
his mold were scholars —whom I will label collectively the Old Public 
Intellectuals —like Edmund Wilson, Lionel Trilling, Irving Howe, C. Wright Mills, 
Alfred Kazin, Daniel Bell, and Lewis Mumford. They were nearly all bohemians, as 
Jacoby relates, living in pre-gentrified Greenwich Village during the 1930s, 1940s and 
1950s, moving like sharks from topic to topic, periodical to periodical, without 
academic affiliation. They were, to Jacoby, self-sustaining and self-serving. They were 
independent contractors attentive to the pulse of America.
18 For additional books on this era, see Steven Biel, Independent Intellectuals in the United States, 
1910-1945 (New York: New York University Press, 1992); Harvey M. Teres, Renewing the Left: 
Politics, Imagination, and the New York Intellectuals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America 1889-1963: The Intellectual As a Social Type 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997); and Hilton Kramer, The Twilight o f the 
Intellectuals: Culture and Politics in the Era of the Cold War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999).
19 Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age o f Academe (New York: 
Basic Books, 1987), 235; hereafter cited in the text. Jacoby’s tone and definitional parameters have 
changed little since that publication. See also Dogmatic Wisdom: How the Culture Wars Divert 
Education and Distract America (New York: Doubleday, 1994), especially “Journalists, Cynics 
and Cheerleaders,” 160-191 and The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age o f Apathy 
(New York: Basic Books, 1999), especially “Intellectuals: From Utopia to Myopia,” 101-124. For 
a similar, Jacoby-inflected analysis, see Eugene Goodheart, The Reign of Ideology (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), especially “The Abandoned Legacy of the New York 
Intellectuals,” 82-98. For the flip side—how cultural politics have since affected the university 
system — see Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher 
Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1990).
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Taking Karl Mannheim’s idea of the “free-floating” intellectual quite literally,
Jacoby rhapsodizes about that era (and the luftmenschen of old) in a neat encapsulation
of generational exceptionalism, as though giants once walked the Earth. Since the
1960s, however, Jacoby claims that those cultural omnivores have been suckered by
universities, intoxicated by tenures, and seduced by specialization. In a nutshell,
Jacoby bends academia-at-large over his knee:
[T]he habitat, manners, and idiom of intellectuals have been transformed within 
the past fifty years. Younger intellectuals no longer need or want a larger public; 
they are almost exclusively professors. Campuses are their home; colleagues 
their audience; monographs and specialized journals their media. Unlike past 
intellectuals they situate themselves within fields and disciplines—for good 
reason. Their jobs, advancement, and salaries depend on the evaluation of 
specialists and this dependence affects the issues broached and the language 
employed (6).
Essentially, university life created a vacuum in which all the public intellectuals have 
since been placed: “The generation born around and after 1940 emerged in a society
where the identity of universities and intellectual life was almost complete The
missing intellectuals are lost in the universities” (16). Again and again, Jacoby returns 
to this type of “missing intellectual” who “sought and prized a spare prose” and wrote 
for a “public world” (7). Here Edmund Wilson and Lewis Mumford most closely 
approximate Jacoby’s view of the ideal public intellectual, unaffiliated with the 
university; later “fifties intellectuals” like Lionel Trilling and C. Wright Mills, 
although they were professors at Columbia University, were still “publicists: they 
wrote to and for the educated public” (26).
The real concern of Jacoby’s study, then, is that intellectuals write “to and for 
the educated public,” whether equipped with university positions or not. Invented only
14
in contradistinction to the “private” intellectual of academia, the “public intellectual” 
implies that all intellectual endeavor until the expansion of higher education 
functioned successfully, in the words of Jacoby himself, to “address a general and 
educated audience” with “graceful prose” and “elegant and accessible essays directed 
toward the wider intellectual community” (5, 17). The increasing danger to Jacoby is a 
majority of “college teachers who lived conventional lives and thought conventional 
thoughts” (73). Only with great difficulty could we compare the efficacy and 
frequency of public interaction between Jacoby’s roving, pre-academicized intellectual 
with those “conventional” college teachers who cooped up in colleges during the 
1960s. Thus the university emerges as a confounding factor for Jacoby. On the one 
hand, it becomes the marker for intellectual endeavor and, in doing so, absorbs his 
prior generations of public intellectuals. On the other hand, as Jacoby even concedes, 
the “newly opened and enlarged colleges allowed, if not compelled, intellectuals to 
desert a precarious existence for stable careers. They exchanged the pressures of 
deadlines and free-lance writing for the security of salaried teaching and pensions” 
(14). Indeed, given the “industrial development and urban blight” that gentrified 
Greenwich Village and contributed to the general decline of the bohemia that sheltered 
Jacoby’s public intellectuals through the 1950s, the conditions which accompanied the 
post-World War II expansion of higher education all but demanded the “stable 
careers” of university life (7). And the place for the “incorrigibly independent soul” 
who “contributes to public discussion” was no longer available as universities,
15
corporations and governments specialized and academicized (creating more “stable” 
locations to fill) the frontier of knowledge.
One cannot argue with the basics of Jacoby’s history. It is true that the 
university, in a sense, kidnapped the “last intellectuals” Jacoby so exalts. But his 
evidence is cumulative rather than substantiative: the Doberman Directive 
pathologizes the ills of academia while not recognizing its own built-in nostalgia of a 
bygone era. This nostalgia has blinded Jacoby to several important realities. The most 
salient is that the Old Public Intellectuals were dependent on a particular social and 
economic geography that, once dismantled by the growth of a university-state 
complex, could not support “independent” intellectuals any more. The second is that, 
as Andrew Ross has remarked, the academy constitutes “a massive public sphere in 
itself, involving millions of people in this country alone, and so the idea that you break 
out of the academy in the public is rather a nonsense.”20 And the third is that, despite 
Jacoby’s visceral fear of the university, all of the intellectuals he names in his study 
were educated and trained at universities: while the university may absorb public- 
intellectual endeavor, it is also crucial to the production of public intellectuals.
Part of the problem in evaluating whether public intellectuals still 
exist—Jacoby would say they’re deader than disco—is that there is no real process of 
accreditation and certification. Before the expansion of higher education, of course, 
the importance of diplomas and institutional recognition mattered much less as a point 
of intellectual signification. If, like Edmund Wilson, one wrote frequently on an array
20 Cited in Stanley Fish, Professional Correctness: Liteary Studies and Political Change (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 117.
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of subjects, then one could be considered, absent any other outside laurels, a public 
intellectual (even if institutional recognition was initially needed for entry into public 
intellectualdom). There was no axis of difference between “intellectual” and “public 
intellectual” —every writer was, in a sense, “public.” How one “becomes” a public 
intellectual has never been codified insofar as operating outside the academy and 
writing often for different publications—in essence, the Doberman Directive—have 
acted as markers of a public intellect. As Alan Wolfe writes in An Intellectual in 
Public , his quasi-autobiography of 2003, “in the years in which [Wolfe was] an 
intellectual in public—from the 1960s to the present—there have not been many 
models to follow. During those years, the academic world engaged itself in forms of 
professionalism so strictly defined that little room remained for those willing and able 
to reach a larger audience with their view.” Moreover, the fact that Wolfe solicited 
mass-circulating magazines for his output—mostly book reviews—rather than the 
“scholarly journals” of cloistered academia anoints him de facto  an “intellectual in 
public.” Lest one, however, want to follow Wolfe’s well-hewn path, we are warned, 
by book’s conclusion, that “there can be no guidebook on how to become an 
intellectual in public. There can be only the desire to make sense out of the world one 
issue at a time.”21
If the problem then resides in a professional “guidebook,” one might turn to 
Florida Atlantic University’s recently established “doctoral program for public 
intellectuals.” The program —otherwise named “the Ph.D. in Comparative
21 Alan Wolfe, An Intellectual in Public (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003), 1-3 
and 380.
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Studies” —splits into two: the Public Intellectuals Program and the Program in 
Literatures, Literacies & Linguistics. The goal of the former, according to its website, 
is “to combine theoretical with concrete analysis, preparing students who are 
theoretically confident and knowledgeable about the world they hope to understand ... 
and change.” The areas of pedagogic inquiry—everything including “public policy, 
mass media, literature, aesthetics, ethics, gender, culture and rhetoric,” and then 
some—is avowedly interdisciplinary, but with a twist: it seeks to goose with a broad 
social imperative students “whose work defines, shapes and influences public 
issues.”22 In offering a “unique focus,” according to Dr. Teresa Brennan, the lead 
designer of the program, the probative value here is less a vade mecum for public 
intellectuals than a gesture toward a specialization of function apart from, yet attentive 
to, other forms of intellectual labor like rote analysis or purebred punditry. So too does 
the “unique focus” gesture toward a “change,” which, while nebulous in meaning, is 
far removed from Jacoby’s Old Public Intellectuals, whose importance wasn’t so 
much in serving or affecting the public (since it was already “educated”) as it was in 
their ability to serve themselves without any entangling alliances. But as a move 
toward institutionalization never before afforded to such an historically marginalized 
and conceptually embryonic activity, Florida Atlantic’s degree begs some thorny 
questions. Can a university matriculate a profession—for that, it appears, is its 
objective—that has long, at least in Jacoby’s rendering, premised itself against
22 All information taken from http://www.publicintellectuals.fau.edu.
18
credentialized academia? If so, does that undermine if not neutralize the public 
intellectual’s ability to define, shape and influence public issues?
To be sure, applying the academy’s disciplinary structures and dimensions to 
the public intellectual is a conflicting proposition. The nostalgia embedded in Jacoby’s 
study is allergic to such credentializing—the Doberman Directive has never had any 
method per se except to be perpetually “going public.” What Florida Atlantic’s 
program does accomplish, if nothing else, is the creation and regulation of a profession 
united by common teaching and purpose. By offering a well-rounded education on a 
variety of topics that terminates with a degree, Florida Atlantic makes apparent that 
“public intellectuals” have always been united by a corpus of coursework which 
enabled their work in the first place. Contrary to Jacoby’s potted history, the public 
intellectual was never an autodidact who sort of appeared out of the blue, like a moon 
rock on your front porch; he—and Jacoby’s public intellectuals are all men—was 
trained by a university system that could find its modern-day counterpart in Florida 
Atlantic’s. If Jacoby’s indictment of the university system rests with its professional 
absorption of public intellectuals, one must see Florida Atlantic’s program as 
attempting to produce public intellectuals with professional qualifications that would 
compensate for any reputed extinction. Indeed, as Ellen Willis has written, “the real 
question ... is not whether public intellectuals belong in the academy, or whether the 
univeristy can have a role in educating them, or whether they can contribute to the 
vitality of graduate study. All of these propositions are true. The real question that 
needs to be asked is: what role is the academy going to have in supporting the work of
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public intellectuals?”23 No more, then, can location be said to determine function: by 
which I mean the collegiate institution can either sterilize or it can fortify one’s ability 
to perform as a public intellectual.24 That is a rule that has always provided many 
exceptions (beginning with Mills and Trilling), and it has invariably arrived at a 
location-driven either/or impasse (if you’re in the ivory tower, you languish; if you’re 
outside the moat, you thrive), all of which is deadly for intellectual theory and even 
worse for everyday discussion. The issue is, then, not a matter of establishing a 
drawbridge between the two. Rather, the issue is how to deploy public-intellectual 
work within social and cultural realities that demand a professionalized specialization, 
something which has initiated contention in its own right.
Packaged, Bow-tied, and Available for Comment
Since Jacoby’s post-mortem of public intellectuals, discussion has developed 
that not only presumes public intellectuals exist but that there is a discrete and 
identifiable market for them. In Public Intellectuals: A Study o f Decline, Richard 
Posner argues for such a market composed mainly of “public academic intellectuals,” 
who have, by virtue of their day jobs at universities, muscled out the “independent”
23 Ellen Willis, “Who Will Support the Intellectual’s Work?” The Minnesota Review  (ns 50-51, 
1999), 191.
24 See Anthony Grafton, “The Public Intellectual and the American University,” American Scholar 
(Autumn 2001), 41-55.
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intellectuals prominent in Jacoby’s study.25 Even so, Posner’s idea of the public 
intellectual is one of redundancy:
[T]he intellectual writes for the general public, or at least for a broader than 
merely academic or specialist audience, on “public affairs”—on political matters 
in the broadest sense o f the word, a sense that includes cultural matters when 
they are viewed under the aspect of ideology, ethics, or politics (which may all be 
the same thing) The intellectual, so defined, is the public intellectual.26
If we audit this statement, we find nothing so much as the Doberman Directive
swaddled in personal concern for “public affairs.” Even so, recognizing the political
nature of public-intellectual work, Posner further says that “before there were
universities in which serious intellectual work was done, and even later when
universities were becoming important centers of the production of knowledge, no one
would have thought to draw a distinction between public (with reference to audience)
and nonpublic intellectual endeavor” (27).
And yet, Posner argues, a market has been created for them. The demand,
according to Posner, comes from population and governmental growth, extended
schooling for the average American, and “the vast expansion of the electronic media,
and in particular in the number of radio and television talk shows, with their insatiable
demand for expert commentary on matters of public concern” (26). This is the domain
of infotainment including programs like The Charlie Rose Show and Ted Koppel’s
Nightline as well as public radio and magazines like The New Republic and The New
Yorker. This market—“derived from the demand of the educated general public for
25 More than being fortified with academic positions, some colleges have actively urged—if not 
demanded—that professors market themselves to gain visibility for their respective school. See, for 
example, G. Jeffrey MacDonald, “Colleges push professors into media spotlight,” The Christian 
Science Monitor (25 June 2004): http://www.csmonitor.eom/2004/0625/p 11 sO 1 -legn.html.
26 Posner, Public Intellectuals, 22-23; hereafter cited in the text.
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intellectual information” and facilitated by the media—is “awash” in a steady supply 
of public intellectuals (67). The only shortage Posner sees is “of unaffiliated, and 
specifically of nonacademic, public intellectuals” (68). Measured by an alchemical 
combination of “media mentions, Web hits, and scholarly citations” (194) from 1995 
to 2000, Posner’s market not only ranks the top 546 “public intellectuals,” but he 
breaks down the “media mentions” pack (Henry Kissinger edges out Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan with 12,570 “mentions”) as well as the “scholarly citations” group (here 
Michel Foucault wins in a landslide with 13,238) (209, 212).27 He metes out 
demographical information, too, most notably an 84/16 percentage split between 
males and females.28 Many of the listed “public intellectuals”—from Timothy Leary to 
H.L. Mencken—are deceased, and have been for quite some time.
Aside from imparting compiled statistical data, Posner’s main concern is 
explaining the “decline” in his subtitle—in this case, of quality. Though the “market is 
competitive in the superficial sense”—because of so much demand and supply—it 
operates “without any rules or norms, legal or customary ... and, unlike some other 
information markets, with little in the way of gatekeeping consumer intermediaries” 
(75, 76). But the “chief culprit” to the quality problem “is the modern university. Its 
rise has encouraged a professionalization and specialization of knowledge that, 
together with the comfortable career that the university offers to people of outstanding
27 For good or ill, Hitchens is not numbered in either of the lists.
28 Though beyond the scope of this essay, it would be worth exploring why there is such a large 
gender divide—and whether, in fact, it is true—and why, regardless of its factuality, the discourse 
surrounding the public intellectual is almost invariably put in masculine terms (see especially the 
later section, ‘“Against Bullshit’: The Vocational Practices of Christopher Hitchens”) or else 
typically employs male case studies (this essay included).
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intellectual ability, have shrunk the ranks of the ‘independent’ intellectual. That is the 
intellectual who, being unaffiliated with the university (or, today, a think tank)—an 
outsider to the academic community—can range broadly over matters of public 
concern unconstrained by the specialist’s attitude that a university career breeds” 
(388).29 To Posner, then, the modern university has bred a cultural environment that 
has generated academics who become “public” intellectuals in the sense that they 
acquire celebrity through the media (which demands expertise and credentials), but 
has not generated—in fact, has sidelined—authentic “freebooters [who] range across 
different fields” (54). It is this kind of “freebooter” —here Posner discusses George 
Orwell for a chapter—who, without the constraints of “specialization and 
professionalization,” is most attuned to the “charismatic calling” of the public 
intellectual: “It isn’t primarily a matter of being intelligent and well informed and 
writing clearly, but of being able through force of rhetoric or the example of one’s life 
... to make fresh, arresting, or heterodox ideas credible to the general, or at least the 
educated, public” (85). Armed with communication skills, an entertainment 
dimension, and authority, it is these charismatic public intellectuals—academic or 
not—who most successfully blend the “celebrity and commitment” required to gain 
and keep a public (46, 57).30
29 He continues: “Specialization of knowledge reduces the ability of academic intellectuals to 
speak clearly to general public issues, of nonacademic intellectuals to get a public hearing, and of 
the general educated public to understand arguments about public issues” (52).
30 He continues: “Often one will read an article by a public intellectual not to acquire information 
on which to rely but to be entertained or amused or to be reassured about or reinforced in one’s 
opinions. To the ends of entertainment and solidarity the quality of the public intellectual’s ideas 
may be secondary to his ‘star’ quality or his rhetorical gifts” (52).
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There is, to be sure, a particular strain of careerism here absent from Jacoby’s 
idealized Old Public Intellectuals, who became public intellectuals almost by accident. 
Nonetheless, Posner’s Public Intellectuals is a major signpost on the road of the 
public-intellectual debate. It recognizes a market that has integrated and valorized 
intellectual endeavor (creating experts and professions) within a culture that has, 
historically, ghettoized intellectuals in favor, to employ Neal Gabler’s phrase, of a 
“republic of entertainment.”31 Gathered from the afterclap of book-tour promotion or 
the aftertaste of stale talk-shows, Posner’s market suggests something inevitably 
opportunistic but also culturally necessary. It suggests the idea of a talking-head 
sermonizer as surely as it suggests a benign commissar of opinions adjudicating for 
mass consumption. And the main job of the public intellectual—as if by punching in a 
time-card, lunch pail in tow—is to publicize and organize those opinions. Perhaps less 
introductory icebreaker than white-coated documentarian, the public intellectual’s 
function, it would appear, is simply to attune us to the submerged parallels and 
intersections that exist between and among bodies of texts and forms of culture. Myths 
and symbols, historiography and biography, laws and figures—all are components of 
the same clean-shaven doctrine which stakes out social bugaboos and cultural hang­
ups as the stuff of the intellectual’s turf.
And yet, when Posner describes the “credence goods” of public intellectuals, 
he is not only describing arguments and ideas that demand authority (meaning 
academic credentials), but also the wholesale commodification of intellectual
31 See Neal Gabler, Life: The Movie: How Entertainment Conquered Reality (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1998).
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endeavor. Craving expert knowledge, the market Posner describes sustains intellectual 
labor by demanding specialized bursts of knowledge that (academic) intellectuals are 
more than happy to supply. Such commodification yields what Stanley Fish has called 
“cameo intellectuals”—there equated with academic intellectuals—who “will only get 
a call when the particular issues with which they are identified takes center-stage and 
should that issue lose its sexiness, their media careers will be over.”32 Here Fish (like 
Posner and Jacoby) maintains that fissure between the university and the public. 
Jacoby had originally fingered academia in vitro as the prime suspect for the decline 
of the public intellectual; Posner and Fish, under the auspices of Jacoby’s schematic, 
have since applied Economics 101: those with institutionalized positions will, every 
time, elbow away the freelancers. But whereas Jacoby considers “independence” a key 
com ponent to the pub lic-in te llectual m ake-up, Posner has deem ed 
“independence” —those “freebooters” like Orwell—irrelevant given the realities of 
what the market today demands, even if it means a decline in quality.
Nevertheless, Posner’s public intellectual “obtains an audience by engaging 
with some matter that has the public’s attention” (32). Similarly, Fish’s public 
intellectual “is the public’s intellectual; that is, he or she is someone to whom the 
public regularly looks for illumination on any number of (indeed all) issues.” The 
public intellectual is “not someone who takes as his or her subject matters of public 
concern—every law professor does that; a public intellectual is someone who takes as
32 Fish, Professional Correctness, 118.
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his or her subject matters of public concern, and has the public’s attention.”33 This 
interpretive intercession by Fish is important, for it both clarifies the realities of 
public-intellectual endeavor (one must, in this sense, be a “public figure” as well as 
write on “matters of public concern”) and points to the occupational hazards that lurk 
therein.
How one then gets the “public’s attention”—by being a public figure or 
engaging a public issue, or both—is another issue altogether, and one that reveals the 
problems of Posner’s public-intellectual “market.” By not differentiating between 
dead and alive public intellectuals, Posner in fact hamstrings the public intellectual’s 
function to speak on “some matter that has the public’s attention”—which, more often 
than not, involves something current and pressing. While someone like Orwell can 
speak from the grave on matters of literature and culture (and serve as a model for 
aspiring public intellectuals), he can’t exactly explicate the necessary 
particulars—unless, that is, the Soviet Union spontaneously reforms. Even then, 
Orwell—who can hardly “want publicity both for its own sake and as advertising for 
[his] books and public lectures” (61) —would be trading on his status as a “public 
figure” far more than his intellectual ability to engage in such a matter. Likewise, 
Posner’s market fails to truly take into account intellectual commitment and credibility 
(“the example of one’s life”), two qualifications which variously trouble many of 
those ranked, including Kissinger and Ezra Pound (who’s also long deceased). In 
effect, then, Posner offers no lodestar for the intellectual except celebrity for
33 Ibid., 119.
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celebrity’s sake.34 His study is really descriptive rather than prescriptive. Even so, it is 
probably fair to say at this point that selling oneself—promoting oneself in a way that 
establishes “publicness” —is unavoidable.35 But how one acquires “publicness” and 
commands the “public’s attention” are both central to the very meaning of the public 
intellectual itself and questions to which I now turn.
Making Opposition Functional
In No Respect: Intellectuals & Popular Culture, Andrew Ross shows how 
intellectuals (counting many of Jacoby’s sacrosanct luftmenschen) have increasingly 
endeavored to monumentalize popular culture—the expressions and products of a 
mass society—as an important site of our social construction.36 Their work explicitly 
freighted popular culture with the weight of revelatory enlightenment and expressly 
assented to an abiding faith in, and an enduring obligation to, the descriptive 
examination of mass phenomena. As a reaction (in part) to culture industry critiques of 
the Frankfurt School, popular culture studies was an approach both welcome and
34 See also Michael Berube, “Going Public,” The Washington Post (7 July 2002): in response to 
Posner’s book and his economics of measured celebrity, Berube says sarcastically, “A public 
intellectual in 2002, apparently, is simply an intellectual who generates a lot of publicity.”
35 See Jeffrey J. Williams, “Spin Doctorates: From Public Intellectuals to Publicist Intellectuals,” 
The Village Voice (7 November 1995).
36 See also Thomas Molnar, The Decline o f the Intellectual (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 
1961), 278: “While the intellectual is called upon to perform the function of mediation between the 
groups of the pluralistic society, he is also enjoined to justify the existing or emerging mass values.
... they are never denounced ultimately and irrevocably since they are signs and symbols of social 
cohesion, o f the efficacy o f the democratic machinery o f education, press and mass 
communication.” See also George Lipsitz, “Listening to Learn and Learning to Listen: Popular 
Culture, Cultural Theory and American Studies,” in Locating American Studies: The Evolution of 
a Discipline, ed. Lucy Maddox (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 310-334.
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warranted. The intellectual scale of ambition adjusted to decode the terrain of mass
culture, where concepts such as race, ethnicity, gender, and citizenship are constantly
negotiated and in flux. In this environment, though, as Ross concedes either by way of
ringing endorsement or resigned admission, it has obviated the need for “opposition”:
the mantle o f opposition no longer rests upon the shoulders o f an autonomous 
avant-garde: neither the elite metropolitan intellectuals who formed the 
traditional corpus o f public tastemakers or opinion-makers; nor the romantic neo­
bohemians who shaped the heroic Nietzschean image o f the unattached dissenter, 
committed to the lonely articulation of social truths; nor the organic party cadres 
whom Lenin shaped after the model of the “professional revolutionary.”37
By the end of his study, Ross has described intellectuals so progressively
steeped in popular culture—having charted them from allies of the governmentally
demonized Rosenbergs to the gatekeepers of camp and pornography—that their
viability is contingent upon their engagement with—and, one might say, justification
of—popular or mass culture. John Seabrook has otherwise called this “nobrow
culture,” where commercial culture, rather than what intellectuals define themselves
against, is a source of status and where cultural value constantly shifts under the halo
of “buzz.”38
In the context of public-intellectual work, such a “nobrow culture” highlights 
the competing importance scholars have placed upon “opposition”—to governments 
and institutions of power—as a modus operandi for cultural critique. Edward Said, for 
instance, has said that the public intellectual is “someone whose place it is publicly to 
raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to
37 Andrew Ross, No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989), 
210 .
38 See John Seabrook, Nobrow: The Culture o f Marketing, The Marketing o f Culture (New York: 
Vintage, 2001).
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produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or 
corporations.”39 Michel Foucault has spoken of the intellectual’s role as “to question 
over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental 
habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to 
reexamine rules and institutions.”40 Noam Chomsky positions intellectuals “to expose 
the lies of government, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and 
often hidden intentions .... For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the 
leisure, the facilities and the training to seek the truth lying hidden beneath the veil of 
distortion and misrepresentation, ideology, and class interest through which events of 
current history are presented to us.”41 And Carl Boggs has sussed out the critical 
intellectual, who is oppositional in “a counterhegemonic subversion of dominant belief 
systems; the struggle for occupational autonomy and control of the workplace; a 
critique of specific institutional practices and policies; rebellion against the norms and 
routines of daily life; and the affirmation of new visions for the future.”42
In essence, each of the above approaches don’t engage the “public” as much as 
they defiantly oppose it. The reasoning here speaks to a larger representational 
crisis—how to advocate and for whom to advocate—in the public-intellectual debate, 
all of which we can center around the notion of the “public sphere” as articulated by
39 Cited in Posner, Public Intellectuals, 30.
40 Michel Foucault, “The Concern for Truth,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 255.
41 Noam Chomsky, American Power and The New Mandarins (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 
324.
42 Carl Boggs, Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity (New York: State University Press of New 
York, 1993), 162. See also Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of 
the Public Sphere (New York: Guilford Press, 2000).
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Jurgen Habermas.43 Defined as a sort of liminal space, the “public sphere” —“the 
sphere of private people come together as a public”—has since the eighteenth century 
been eroded and reduced to “administered” conversation of “professional dialogues”: 
“rational debate of private people becomes one of the production numbers .... 
Discussion, now a business, becomes formalized.”44 For Habermas, the mass 
media—television, radio, print, now the Internet—has not only supplanted our need 
(and desire) to chew the critical fat (by presenting a salonish mock-up), it has also 
boiled down the pool of available topics to crusty chestnuts. Rather than seeing mass 
culture as participatory and multivalent, Habermas views it as repressive, an 
“impersonal indulgence in stimulating relaxation than to a public use of reason.”45 In 
other words, mass culture—at least in matters of public policy—tends to loop the 
same story, sanitizing public opinion and marginalizing if not removing the disruptive 
arguments of intellectuals. As Boggs writes, this is precisely where “in a social order 
that dwells upon surface appearances and routinely depoliticizes public discourse, 
radical insurgency [of critical intellectuals] is forced not only to articulate 
counterhegemonic themes and possibilities but also to penetrate the dense world of
43 For criticisms and elaborations of Habermas, see Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public 
Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), especially Michael Shudson, “Was There Ever 
a Public Sphere? If so, When? Reflections on the American Case,” 143-163 and Michael Warner, 
“The Mass Subject and the Mass Subject,” 377-401. See also Bruce Robbins, ed., The Phantom 
Public Sphere (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), especially Nancy 
Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy,” 1 -32 and Stanley Aronowitz, “Is a Democracy Possible? The Decline of the Public in 
the American Debate,” 75-92.
44 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991), 
27, 164.
45 Ibid., 170.
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media manipulation. The time-honored purpose of critical intellectual activity is to
challenge, probe, confront and disrupt—that is, to constitute a vital ideological
counterforce to the power structure.”46
This conception of the public sphere—where the media and the government
collude to dispossess the “public” of political discourse and informed decision-making
capabilities—creates what Walter Lippmann has otherwise called (if a little
approvingly) “the phantom public.”47 Where the public intellectual is thought to then
stand—between public and power—is as a recuperative function of committed
criticism. In this case, the critical capacity of a public intellectual is directed in the
service of issues that most affect the public: the “power structures” that set policy. As
an index of public-intellectual work, such an oppositional stance has also thawed the
posterity enjoyed by the Old Public Intellectuals. As Michael Berube has argued in his
essay “Cultural Criticism and the Politics of Selling Out,” they might just be
considered plaster saints at best and negligent custodians at worst:
I want also to introduce into our discussions o f the “public intellectual” the 
overdue recognition that the New York intellectuals were often the worst kind of 
armchair quarterbacks and fence-sitters, “activists” whose only activism  
consisted o f essays in Dissent or Partisan Review. Time and again, when crucial 
social issues were on the table, the New Yorkers elected to pass: and when it 
came to taking stands on the Vietnam War, on school desegregation and 
decentralization, on the W om en’s Movement, many o f the so-called public 
intellectuals o f the 1950s and 1960s compiled a deplorable record. (The New  
York Review o f  Books, for instance, largely opposed the women's movement but 
was a strong antiwar voice; Irving Howe, meanwhile, declined to oppose the war 
at all.)48
46 Boggs, Intellectuals and the Crisis of Modernity, 182.
47 See Walter Lippman, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999) 
and Public Opinion (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
48 Michael Berube, “Cultural Criticism and the Politics of Selling,” Electronic Book Review (19 
September 2003): www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?command=view essay&ess
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The idea that Berube pinpoints here is something beyond the Doberman 
Directive. It requires not only frequent “public” interaction—writing often in 
magazines, journals, and books (all of which most public intellectuals do)—but also 
an active oppositional stance in pressing issues of the moment. This idea moves 
beyond Alan W olfe’s book reviews and particularizes Cornel W est’s notion of 
“addressing urgent public problems which enlightens and energizes fellow citizens.” 
The assumption here, I think, is that by indexing bytes of information and strands of 
thought, intellection is somehow spun into the episodic action which attends tangible 
change—change, in some measured form, being the end-game of any public- 
intellectual enterprise.
And yet, as Stuart Hall has noted, “there is all the difference in the world 
between understanding the politics of intellectual work and substituting intellectual 
work for politics.”49 Put another way, to be an oppositional public intellectual does not 
necessarily effect, much less resolve, knotted political problems. What we can say 
about “oppositional thinking” is that its approach relies just as much on effort as 
principle—that, given the public platform of celebrity, it behooves intellectuals to 
intervene oppositionally as much as possible (rather than, say, offer expertise on 
pornography). And by taking for granted that “public opinion” is either completely 
wrong or inexorably manipulated, opposition not only guarantees the public
ay id=berubece. In a different form, this essay was also the keynote address at a conference on 
“Western Humanities, Pedagogy, and the Public Sphere,” for the Fourth Annual Cultural Studies 
Symposium at Kansas State University during March 9-11, 1995.
49 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies,” in Cultural Studies, eds. Lawrence 
Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula A. Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992), 286.
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intellectual continued “publicity” (by deviating from the norm) but it also attempts, in 
its own way, to reinvigorate the public by opposing its opinion (which, as I ’ve 
discussed, is really a composite of conventional wisdom and status quoism that is 
ritualized and perpetuated by the mass media). It is in this respect public-intellectual 
work hopes to have broad political effect by trying to generate a sense of a public 
community.
We must also consider this issue of “opposition” as centering the very 
particular kind of intellectual labor that “public intellectuals” are seen to provide. 
Lionel Trilling famously put forward the notion of an “adversarial culture,” where 
intellectuals operate as almost a separate critical stratum set against the cultural norms 
of society.50 In The Future o f Intellectuals and the Rise o f the New Class, Alvin 
Gouldner further developed this notion, in which professionalized critics inhabit a 
“New Class as the paradigm of virtuous and legitimate authority, performing with 
technical skill and with dedicated concern for society-at-large.”51 This is a world run 
by experts and technocrats, who bear transformative values that will create what 
Gouldner calls elsewhere a “culture of critical discourse.”52 In this way, intellectuals 
become professionalized because knowledge becomes professionalized. The 
problem—or advantage—with the New Class, as other scholars have remarked, is that 
it entails a kind of embourgeoisement of cultural capital that institutionalizes
50 See “Preface” to Lionel Trilling, Beyond Culture: Essays on Literature and Learning (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965).
51 Alvin Gouldner, The Future o f Intellectuals and the Rise o f the New Class (New York: 
Continuum, 1979), 19.
52 Alvin Gouldner, Against Fragmentation: The Origins o f Marxism and the Sociology of 
Intellectuals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 30.
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knowledge as power.53 Here professionalized critics, who have historically operated on 
the periphery of American culture, are installed as a class of moral oversight and 
virtuous arbitration. By comparison, the importance placed upon opposition clearly 
strives to resist being consolidated into the structures (and strictures) of power, and it 
also explains the reluctance (starting with Jacoby) to professionalize the role of the 
public intellectual. Without professionalized duties, the public intellectual can escape 
a sort of ontological status—and a specialization of knowledge —that could 
pigeonhole its function.
Even still, the issue of “opposition” reveals how crucial professionalization has 
always been to public-intellectual work. While the decline in quantity and quality 
variously described by Jacoby and Posner has been blamed on university politics or 
economic markets, one might instead attribute those declines to a lack of a 
professional apparatus that would prioritize the public intellectual’s function. To 
separate and focus an oppositional function would mean, in a sense, to professionalize 
the public intellectual. In doing so, the public intellectual would be professionalized 
more by a specialization of function than a specialization of knowledge. Of course this 
oppositional function would involve celebrity status, but the celebrity would be an 
appendage to that professional obligation of opposition. It would also, at the same 
time, resist the institutional problem of the New Class by decentralizing opposition,
53 See, for example, Alain G. Gagnon, “The Role of Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies: Political 
Influence and Social Involvement,” in Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies: Political Influence 
and Social Involvement, ed. Alain G. Gagnon (New York: Praeger, 1987), 8-11.
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not consolidating expertise, within the public sphere, thus ensuring vigorous public 
debate that may prompt action.
“Against Bullshit”: The Vocational Practices of Christopher Hitchens
As a public figure and working journalist, Hitchens complicates many of the 
presumptions and preoccupations of the public-intellectual debate. For one thing, he’s 
independent—that is, he freelances for many different publications, operates outside 
the academy very much like Edmund Wilson or Irving Howe and thus fulfills the basic 
demands of the Doberman Directive. The architecture of Hitchens’s career, though he 
was educated at a university, has never really included a university — while he 
certainly shows the educational background common to most public intellectuals, he 
has not used the university as an institution to support his work. On the surface, 
Hitchens at once disproves that independent intellectuals are extinct (according to 
Jacoby) and reaffirms that academic public intellectuals have cornered the public- 
intellectual market (according to Posner, Hitchens is among a dwindling breed). So 
too has Hitchens confirmed that even the “freebooters” are susceptible to the lures of 
the punditocracy (remember his vamping with Heston) and media celebrity culture: on 
the cover of Letters to a Young Contrarian, for example, Hitchens wears a trench coat 
and a bewhiskered scowl, while holding a cigarette as a puff of smoke corkscrews into 
the air. It is a book cover, after all, but the level of postured affectation bespeaks a sort 
of commodification—here, the book cover suggests, is someone bent on controversy
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(or else shadowy Cold War-era espionage) to the exclusion of all else—one would 
expect only to befall “cameo intellectuals.”
Yet Hitchens has also gone to great lengths to define what qualities—both 
intellectual and temperamental—must attend public-intellectual work. In fact, the 
qualities Hitchens has introduced during his career represent one of the most 
significant interventions to the public-intellectual debate, both elaborating and 
problematizing the evolution of such an (un)profession. Amidst what Seabrook had 
labeled “nobrow culture,” Hitchens has attempted to forge what I will call “vocational 
opposition” as a litmus test for the public intellectual.54 To get a sense of what I mean 
by his “vocational opposition,” I first offer a long quotation by Hitchens taken from 
“The Future of the Public Intellectual” panel in New York:
I’ve increasingly become convinced that in order to be any kind o f a 
public-intellectual commentator or combatant, one has to be unafraid o f the 
charges of elitism. One has to have, actually, more and more contempt for public 
opinion and for the way in which it’s constructed and aggregated, and polled and 
played back and manufactured and manipulated. If only because all these 
processes are actually undertaken by the elite and leave us all, finally, voting in 
the passive voice and believing that w e’re using our own opinions or concepts 
when in fact they have been imposed upon us.
Now, to “consider the alternatives” might be a definition o f the critical 
mind or the alive intelligence. That’s what the alive intelligence and the critical 
mind exist to do: to consider, tease out and find alternatives. It’s a very striking 
fact about the current degeneration of language, that that very term, those very 
words are used in order to prevent, to negate, consideration of alternatives. So, be 
aware. Fight it every day, when you read gunk in the paper, when you hear it 
from your professors, from your teachers, from your pundits. Develop that kind 
o f resistance.
54 I have derived the “vocational” part of this expression from Bruce Robbins, Secular Vocations: 
Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture (London: Verso, 1993), whose explanation of a “secular 
vocation” is consonant with my meaning: “not an unearned sense of self-importance, not an 
unquestioned or unaccountable authority, but that part of professional discourse which appeals to 
(and helps refashion) public values in its effort to justify (and refashion) professional practice” 
(25).
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I think it would be a very sad thing if the word “intellectual” lost its 
sense that there was something basically malcontent, unsound and untrustworthy 
about the person who was claiming the high honor o f the title. In politics, the 
public is the agora, not the academy. The public element is the struggle for 
opinion. It’s certainly not the party system or any other form whereby loyalty can 
be claimed of you or you can be conscripted.
I would say that because the intellectual has some responsibility, so to 
speak, for those who have no voice, that a very high task to adopt now would be 
to set oneself and to attempt to set others, utterly and contemptuously and 
critically and furiously, against the now almost daily practice in the United States 
o f human sacrifice. By which I mean, the sacrifice, the immolation of men and 
women on death row in the system o f capital punishment. Something that has 
become an international as well as a national disgrace. Something that shames 
and besmirches the entire United States, something that is performed by the 
professionalized elite in the name of an assumed public opinion. In other words, 
something that melds the worst of elitism and the absolute foulest o f populism.
People used to say, until quite recently, using the words of Jimmy Porter 
in Look Back in Anger, the play that gave us the patronizing term “angry young 
man” —well, “there are no good, brave causes anymore.” There’s nothing really 
worth witnessing or worth fighting for, or getting angry, or being boring, or being 
humorless about. I disagree and am quite ready to be angry and boring and 
humorless. These are exactly the sacrifices that I think ought to be exacted from 
oneself. Let nobody say there are no great tasks and high issues to be confronted.
The real question will be whether we can spread the word so that arguments and 
debates like this need not be held just in settings like these but would be the 
common property o f anyone with an inquiring mind. And then, we would be able 
to look at each other and ourselves and say, “Well, then perhaps the intellectual is 
no longer an elitist.”55
Here Hitchens calls attention to several issues that contrast sharply with 
previous conceptualizations of the public intellectual given by Posner, West, and 
Jacoby. Where Posner’s market features many dead “public intellectuals,” Hitchens 
shows that concept to be oxymoronic. The “great tasks” for Hitchens are always 
presen t ones that require, quite literally, an “alive intelligence.” And whereas 
“opposition” figures nominally for West and Jacoby (“leadership” could be opposition 
for West; as for Jacoby, the word “opposition” hardly appears in The Last
55 Christopher Hitchens, “The Future of the Public Intellectual,” The Nation.
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Intellectuals), Hitchens foregrounds his conception of the public intellectual with 
opposition (to “set oneself and to attempt to set others, utterly and contemptuously and 
critically and furiously”) and with vocation (to speak “for those who have no voice” as 
“the sacrifices that I think ought to be exacted from oneself’). This is where Hitchens 
complicates the matter of opposition by showing it to be more a temperamental 
prerequisite than a professional attribute. In an interview, for example, Hitchens said 
that “the oppositional character, I am certain, is innate in some people. I ’m not sure if 
it’s innate originally in all people and only manifest in some; I couldn't say. But I do 
know for certain that it was innate in me, and that I seem to have found going through 
life that I naturally meet other people who feel the same. It's very difficult to explain, 
but you recognize the symptoms of a fellow sufferer when you encounter one.”56 And 
in the dedication page of his hagiographic study, Why Orwell Matters, Hitchens tips 
his hat to the Soviet Union historian Robert Conquest, “premature anti-fascist, 
premature anti-Stalinist, poet and mentor, and founder of ‘the united front against 
bullshit’.”57 In other words, while Florida Atlantic’s doctorate may gesture toward 
professional regulation by board-certified study, it cannot necessarily teach the 
“oppositional character”—very much an uncommodifiable quality—that directs the 
knowledge gained from that program. If opposition indicates public-intellectual work 
for Hitchens, it emerges as something that demands more than professionalization. It 
demands a vocation.
56 Harry Kreisler, “A Dissenting Voice: A Conversation with Christopher Hitchens,” 
Conversations with History (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley): 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/Hitchens/hitchens-con2.html.
57 See Christopher Hitchens, Why Orwell Matters (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
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Thus in Hitchens’s world, elitism is contrarian, it is malcontent, and it is 
almost gladiatorial. It is, above all, oppositional to public opinion that is “constructed 
and aggregated, and polled and played back and manufactured and manipulated” by 
the “professionalized elite.” This attitudinal elitism against the “professionalized 
elite” —here institutions of powers and the state—is more than mere criticism: it 
considers “opposition,” again, less a professional qualification than a vocational 
bearing with long-term goals. As such, Hitchens acts both elitist and populist: by 
opposing “public opinion” formalized by the “professionalized elite,” he hopes to 
invigorate the eroded public (sphere) and, as he said during the panel discussion, to 
“spread the word so that arguments and debates like this need not be held just in 
settings like these but would be the common property of anyone with an inquiring 
mind. And then, we would be able to look at each other and ourselves and say, ‘Well, 
then perhaps the intellectual is no longer an elitist.’” (In the context of critic 
Christopher Lasch, Peter Augustine Lawler has called this “therapeutic elitism.”58) 
Thus the public intellectual demands a oppositional capacity, or an attitudinal elitism, 
to “public opinion” as well as a vocational commitment, or an aspirational populism, 
to under-represented “publics” like death-row inmates.
Three of Hitchens’s major books demonstrate how he has applied his 
“oppositional character” to public opinion generated by the “professionalized elite.”59
58 See Peter Augustine Lawler, “Moral Realism Versus Therapeutic Elitism: Christopher Lasch’s 
Populist Defense of American Character,” in Postmodernism Rightly Understood: The Return to 
Realism in American Thought (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 157-178.
59 As books involve more sustained criticisms, I have elected to use them as examples. There are, 
however, numerous articles that are similar in approach. See, for examples, Christopher Hitchens, 
“The D ala i Lama: H is M aterial H igh n ess,” S a l o n  (13  July 1998):
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In his broadside of Mother Teresa in The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in 
Theory and Practice, Hitchens judges “Mother Teresa’s reputation by her actions and 
words rather than the actions and words by her reputation.”60 He argues that Mother 
Teresa is “a religious fundamentalist, a political operative, a primitive sermonizer, and 
an accomplice of worldly secular powers,” as well as “the emissary of a very 
determined and very politicized papacy” (56). According to the Hitchens, she treats 
the poor not so much as people in need but as the instruments of her work in “a 
fundamentalist religious campaign” and “on occasion for piety” (41). He continues: 
“The decision not to [fund a proper hospital], and to run instead a haphazard and 
cranky institution which would expose itself to litigation and protest were it run by 
any branch of the medical profession, is a deliberate one. The point is not the honest 
relief of suffering but the promulgation of a cult based on death and suffering and 
subjection” (67). Without an oppositional agenda, one might argue, such a “cult” 
might have never been investigated. After all, who would dare, as Hitchens writes in 
the foreword, “to pick on a wizened, shriveled old lady, well-stricken in years, who 
has consecrated her entire life to the needy and the destitute” (1) except someone 
avocated to do so?
Witness also Hitchens’s apostasy during the Clinton/Lewinsky imbroglio. 
Despite his leftist sympathies, he tackled the former president with the for-the-sake-of- 
argument brio characteristic of his type of public intellectual: “I thought at one point
http://www.salon.com/news/1998/07/13news.html and Christopher Hitchens, “Unfairenheit 9/11: 
The Lies of Michael Moore,” Slate (21 June 2004): http://slate.msn.com/id/2102723.
60 Christopher Hitchens, The Missionary Position: Mother Teresa in Theory and Practice (London: 
Verso, 1995), 24; hereafter cited in the text.
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that I might have to resign from [The Nation]. That was over, in general, its defense of 
Bill Clinton in office, which I still think was a historic mistake made by left-liberals in 
this country. It completely squandered the claim of a magazine like The Nation to be a 
journal of opposition. By supporting Clinton, The Nation became a journal more or 
less of the consensus.”61 In his book on the former president, No One Left To Lie To: 
The Triangulations o f William Jefferson Clinton, Hitchens writes of Clinton’s use of 
public money and tactics to intimidate people—mostly women with whom Clinton 
had liaisoned—who might embarrass him. Hitchens also suggests Clinton launched 
missiles into the Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq for the purpose of “distract[ing] 
attention from his filthy lunge at a beret-wearing cupcake.”62 Conservatives and 
Republicans, of course, were no stranger to character attacks, yet it was Hitchens’s 
opposition that attempted to demonstrate how, as even conservative columnist David 
Horowitz admitted, “this mattered to the policy issues the public cares deeply about 
.... In making his own powerful case against Clinton, Hitchens has underscored how 
Republicans botched the process by focusing on criminality that flowed from minor 
abuses of power—the sexual harassment of Paula Jones and its Monica Lewinsky 
subtext—while ignoring a major abuse that involved corrupting the presidency, 
damaging the nation’s security and killing innocents abroad.”63 Triangulations was the
61 Southan, “Free Radical: An Interview with Christopher Hitchens,” Reason.
62 Christopher Hitchens, No One Left To Lie To: The Triangulations of William Jefferson Clinton 
(London: Verso, 1999), 87.
63 David Horowitz, “Hats o ff  to a condemned man,” S a l o n  (1 March 1999): 
http://www.salon.com/col/horo/1999/03/nc 01horo.html.
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essential work of the “vocationally opposition” public intellectual: railing against the 
popular consensus with criticism steeped in public policy.
The last and latest of the three, The Trial o f Henry Kissinger, launches a 
kitchen-sink blitzkrieg against President Nixon’s former secretary of state, accusing 
him of “the deliberate mass killing of civilian populations in Indochina” and “the 
personal suborning and planning of murder of a senior constitutional officer in a 
democratic nation—Chile—with which the United State was not at war.”64 The 
suggested rap sheet also includes Kissinger’s part in prolonging the Vietnam war and 
other felonies in Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor and Washington, D.C. Failure, for 
Hitchens, to issue a warrant for Kissinger’s trial “will constitute a double or triple 
offense to justice. First, it will violate the essential and now uncontested principle that 
even not the most powerful are above the law. Second, it will suggest that 
prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity are reserved for losers, or for 
minor despots in relatively negligible countries. This in turn will lead to the paltry 
politicization of what could have been a noble process, and to the justifiable 
suspicions of double standards.”65 With some notable exceptions, the charges Hitchens 
levied were fairly new.66 By compiling them as an indictment for a trial, Hitchens in 
effect spoke for those butchered in Chile, Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor and even 
Washington, D.C.67
64 Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger (London: Verso, 2001), x.
65 Ibid., xi.
66 See, for example, Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan, The Arrogance o f Power: The Secret 
World of Richard Nixon (New York: Penguin Books, 2000).
67 Says Hitchens (in Christopher Hitchens, “You ask the questions,” The Independent): “With 
Kissinger, you can tell how many people he killed. With Mother Teresa, who only preached
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And yet, given what Hitchens has chosen to write about, one must ask what 
effect this “vocational opposition” even has. Despite Hitchens’s calls for arrest, neither 
Kissinger nor Clinton, much less Mother Teresa, have been to date hauled into The 
Hague for prosecution. Effectiveness—or widespread popular adoption—is not 
necessarily the point; the hope, I think, behind “vocational opposition” is not to have 
immediate solutions (though that would be nice) but rather to show how good-faith 
religion can turn bad and how bad-faith imperialism can turn worse. “Vocational 
opposition” is very much a fe lt  obligation to the problems which, caused by 
government or institutional powers, affect (or have the potential to affect) a large 
majority of people.
But as a member of the mass media, the oppositional function Hitchens has 
sought to practice has necessitated the publicity he needs—or enjoys—in order to 
acquire and maintain that function and the audiences for his work. Hitchens’s pose on 
the cover of Contrarian—in fact, the way he usually comports himself — surely seeks 
to maintain, as he said at the panel discussion on “The Future of the Public 
Intellectual,” “something basically malcontent, unsound and untrustworthy about the 
person who was claiming the high honor of the title [of intellectual].” No doubt 
Hitchens markets himself—essentially, selling himself as product with expected 
attributes and axes-to-grind—in an environment of increasing media specialization 
and competitiveness. In this way, Hitchens shows that commodification is now 
inevitable if not a necessary evil, whether one has credentials or not. Given his
surrender to poverty, disease and ignorance and against family planning, we can’t be sure of the 
figures. But together they certainly make two out of the four pale riders of the Apocalypse.”
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previous statements and work output, I would argue, however, that Hitchens has 
sought to make opposition and a commitment to it the index of the public intellectual 
(its specialization, as it were) and any following publicity (or visibility) a by-product 
(rather than a signifier) of the “public” designation. Put alternatively, opposition is 
more than a pose—it is, for Hitchens, the practical essence of his vocation.
Conclusion: Between Obsolescence and Acceptance
It is often said that, as a subject, the public intellectual exceeds in always 
inviting interpretation but resisting explanation. Invoked at a dinner party, reactions 
run from knowing nods and furrowed brows to visceral hostility and guarded 
suspicion, like turning your nose at something in the refrigerator that’s spoiled. 
Because it has been continually used by academics, columnists, and critics alike to 
take their own temperatures (and the temperatures of each other), its discussion usually 
attends a frission of self-regard and a shakedown for a bottom-line answer: “Are 
intellectuals doing enough for the public?” I would reply, simply, that this question 
cannot be answered like some arithmetical equation—few can, for that matter.
One of the aims of this essay has been to describe and suggest the field of 
accomplishment and system of recognition by which the concept of the public 
intellectual has developed and how Hitchens has sought to demarcate and further 
refine its purpose. This purpose, I hope to have shown, is not the result of mandarin 
tastemakers spinning webs of their own significance; it is the result of an intellectual 
taxonomy that attempts to prioritize authority within a constellation of competing
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critical fiefdoms. Questions of who speaks for whom and how one speaks are 
proximate to the very notion of identity politics today. By no means does Hitchens 
represent the ideal public intellectual, but he does emphasize that the cultural 
formation of public intellectuals requires not only institutional training at universities 
and professional regulation but also (at least in his case) a vocational commitment to 
opposition. The “vocational opposition” Hitchens offers is more than knee-jerk 
adversarianism: it is a production of knowledge based on a division of intellectual 
labor that demands a specialization of function directed at public policy issues of 
which popular opinion is often the most ignorant. That function, I have argued, would 
signify the public intellectual less as a celebrity (though it certainly recognizes the 
conspicuous level of performance endemic to this labor) than someone legitimated by 
a sense of constituency with public debate that nourishes a healthy liberal democratic 
society. Only by approaching the public intellectual from this angle, I think, can we 
begin to reconcile and come to terms with a discourse that name-drops Christopher 
Hitchens and Henry Kissinger in the same breath.
If there is a new challenge here, it is in developing a more textured history for 
those who have mainly operated outside the print medium and asking if their 
contributions, balanced against the pull of celebrity, pass muster as public-intellectual 
work. After all, intellectual labor has always been strongly tied to writing, but that 
shouldn’t stop us inquiring if, for example, Michael Moore—with his documentary 
exposes on corporate America and the “war on terror”—is a bodement for future 
public-intellectual cinema. One could argue that print, by its very nature, is less open
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to the criticisms of demagoguery that afflicted Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, and is 
therefore more capable of preserving a needed credibility. Then again, Moore’s 
controversial status, as much as Hitchens’s, might indicate the lasting fate of public 
intellectuals, always stranded between obsolescence and acceptance.
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